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Sportsbook pricing and the behavioral biases of bettors in the NHL 
 
Rodney J. Paul, St. Bonaventure University 
Andrew P. Weinbach, Coastal Carolina University 
 
Abstract 
The betting market for the NHL is investigated using actual betting percentages on favorites and underdogs from 
real sportsbooks. Sportsbooks do not appear to attempt to price to balance the book as betting percentages are not 
proportional to set odds. As in the NFL and NBA, bettors are shown to have a strong preference for favorites and 
road favorites in particular. Simple strategies of betting against significant imbalances toward the favorite are shown 
to generate positive returns. Although not pricing to balance the book, sportsbooks do not appear to price to exploit 
known bettor biases in all cases. Clear bettor behavioral biases for road favorites are not priced into the odds as the 
prices set in these cases appear to be a forecast of game outcomes. Pricing as a forecast may ensure long-run 
viability for the sportsbook as it discourages entry into this market by informed traders and still allows the 
sportsbook to capture its commission on losing bets over time.  
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JEL Classification G1 
The unearthing of actual betting data from real sportsbooks has allowed a more complete investigation of how 
sportsbooks truly set prices and, more importantly, has deepened our understanding of efficient markets, or lack 
thereof, within this market. Under the traditional models of sportsbook behavior, such as Pankoff (1968), Zuber et 
al. (1985), and Sauer et al. (1988), sportsbooks were assumed to set a market-clearing price by balancing the book. 
This price would split the betting action between both sides of the wagering proposition. Setting prices which 
balance the book allows sportsbooks to earn risk free returns when wagering balance is achieved, with sportsbooks 
earning their commission (under an 11-to-win-10 betting rule) on losing bets. Given that the observed price was 
assumed to be a result of the actions of bettors, sports betting markets became a natural place to test the efficient 
markets hypothesis. Findings in support of the efficient markets hypothesis within these wagering markets, where 
public sentiment is likely to run extremely high, served as a significant stamp of approval of this theory and 
supported the notion of the general “Wisdom of Crowds”. 
 Levitt (2004) challenged the traditional models of sportsbook behavior. His hypothesis assumes 
sportsbooks set prices to maximize profits, rather than setting prices to balance the book. Through the use of data 
from a betting tournament for the NFL, Levitt showed that bettors tend to prefer certain wagers, such as road 
favorites, and sportsbooks incorporate these known bettor biases into prices. With biased prices, sportsbooks earn 
higher profits by becoming an active participant in the wager, effectively wagering on the less-popular side of the 
proposition. Under the Levitt hypothesis, sportsbooks are not only good at forecasting game outcomes, but also 
know the likely biases of bettors, and are able to exploit these advantages through their pricing. 
 One problem with the study of Levitt (2004) was the use of a betting tournament 
rather than data from an actual sportsbook. Given the betting tournament participants were a small group and paid 
only an entry fee to participate, marginal incentives (the outlay of money per bet and the actual payoff or losses 
occurring with each game bet) normally present in sports gambling markets were absent in the data from the betting 
tournament. Given the small number of participants and the lack of marginal incentives, doubts of the validity of 
these results were expressed. 
 In recent articles in the Journal of Prediction Markets and the International Journal of Sports Finance, Paul 
and Weinbach tested the Levitt model of sportsbook behavior using actual betting data from real sportsbooks. 
Through the use of actual sportsbook data from www.sportsbook.com and data from multiple sportsbooks collected 
by www.sportsinsights.com, Paul and Weinbach showed that betting dollars are not balanced evenly between 
favorites and underdogs (or overs and unders in the totals markets) in the NFL (Paul and Weinbach 2007) and in the 
NBA (Paul and Weinbach 2008). Unlike the assumptions of the traditional models, favorites receive a 
disproportionate share of the betting dollars. In each sport, as the pointspread on the favorite increased, the 
percentage of dollars bet on the favorite also increased. In addition, there was an additional increase in percentage of 
dollars bet on road favorites as opposed to home favorites.  
 These results cast doubt on the traditional models of sportsbook behavior as the betting dollars definitely do 
not appear balanced. Although the findings of these papers allow for a rejection of the null hypothesis that 
sportsbooks attempt to balance betting dollars evenly, the alternative hypothesis is not necessarily the hypothesis 
noted by Levitt (2004). The notion that sportsbooks price to maximize profits, using common bettor biases to their 
advantage, requires a much stronger result. This result would require sportsbooks to earn greater profits by pricing 
where bettors will be wrong more often than they are correct. 
 To determine if sportsbooks are earning greater profits through their choice to set prices other than prices 
which would balance the betting dollars, Paul and Weinbach (2007, 2008) tested and reported results where the 
sportsbook became active participants in the wagers. Specifically, returns were calculated and tested for significance 
in situations where betting dollars were significantly imbalanced. When the percentage bet on the favorite exceeded 
a certain threshold, such as 60% or 70%, returns to betting the favorite (the same side as the public) and returns to 
betting the underdog (the side the sportsbook is “betting” by not balancing the dollars) were calculated. If 
sportsbooks are truly pricing to maximize profits, the betting public should lose their bets on the favorites and the 
sportsbook should win with bets on the underdog. 
 In the case of the NFL (Paul and Weinbach 2007), pricing to exploit bettor biases was found to be 
successful. A strategy of wagering against the betting public was found to generate positive profits. Therefore, 
sportsbooks were winning often enough to earn higher profits by taking a position on the underdog. In the NBA, 
however, this was not the case. Favorites and underdogs were found to evenly split wins and losses against the 
pointspread; independent of how large of a betting imbalance toward the favorite was seen. Therefore, it was 
concluded for the NBA, sportsbooks are pricing more as a forecast of actual game outcomes, rather than to 
maximize their own profits. Pricing as a forecast may still be a long-run profit maximizing strategy, however, even 
in the presence of imbalanced betting dollars, due to the likely repeated game nature of sports wagering. In setting a 
price as a forecast where each side of the proposition wins in proportion to set odds, sportsbooks still earn their 
commission on losing bets in the long-run, without the transactions costs necessary to attempt to balance the book or 
price to exploit biases on a game-by-game basis. This strategy also lessens the incentive for informed bettors to enter 
the market, possibly taking away profits from sportsbooks in the long-run. 
 This paper expands the study of actual sportsbook behavior, comparing the traditional models to the Levitt 
hypothesis and considering alternative theories, by examining the betting market for the National Hockey League. 
The study of the NHL offers a few advantages as the market is relatively small compared to the NFL and prices are 
set in the form of odds, rather than a pointspread. The small nature of the market allows for examination of whether 
sportsbooks are pricing to exploit known bettor biases when the market is rather thin (as the Levitt (2004) suggests), 
if they are pricing to balance the book (as suggested in the traditional models), or pricing as a forecast (as suggested 
by Paul and Weinbach (2008)). In addition, given odds rather than a pointspread, the favorite-longshot bias can be 
investigated.  
 In professional sports which use odds in the betting market, such as Major League Baseball and the 
National Hockey League, a so-called “reverse favorite-longshot bias” was found. This reverse bias implies that 
favorites are overbet and underdogs are underbet meaning that bets on the underdog will win more often than 
implied by efficiency and could lead to profits, which is the opposite of results found in horse racing (the traditional 
favorite-longshot bias). These results were found by Woodland and Woodland (1994, 2001). Both sports were found 
to have a significant reverse favorite-longshot bias. Woodland and Woodland did not equate a unit bet on the 
favorite and the underdog in the proper manner, so their tests were corrected by Gandar et al. (2002) and by Gandar 
et al. (2004). After the corrections were implemented, the baseball betting market was shown not to exhibit the bias 
for all underdogs, but the bias remained significant for the subgroups of slight underdogs and home underdogs. 
Similarly, after the corrections, the bias was still found in the hockey betting market, although to a slightly lesser 
extent than originally estimated.  
 This study uses actual betting market data from four sportsbooks reported by www.sportsinsights.com for 
the NHL. Tests of whether the sportsbook proportionally balances the betting action compared to odds are 
performed. In addition, sportsbooks using a strategy of setting prices to maximize profits is investigated through 
simple betting simulations. The reverse favorite-longshot bias (likely the overbetting of good teams) and home/road 
biases are also explored. 
 
1. Sports insights betting data—NHL 2005–06–2007–08 seasons 
The NHL betting data contains information from three full seasons of the hockey betting market, following the lost 
lockout season of 2004–05. In these years, 2005– 06 to 2007–08, the dominant form of hockey betting changed to 
strictly odds (like baseball), as opposed to the previously popular “Canadian Line” where there existed a pointspread 
(typically a half-goal) and odds. Due to the addition of a shootout and the elimination of ties in hockey, the odds 
wager became the most popular and common form of hockey betting, as each game now concludes with a winning 
and losing team. 
 Sports Insights presents combined data from four sportsbooks to show the percentage of bets on the 
favorite and underdog for its subscribers. The four on-line sportsbooks are BetUS.com, CaribSports.com, 
SportBet.com, and Sportsbook.com. Data were available for each game played in the three seasons, where odds 
were posted. The raw data set includes information on playoff games, all-star games, preseason games, etc. For the 
purposes of this study, however, only regular season games were included. 
 Given the importance of the home/road distinction found in studies of sports which use odds betting 
(specifically baseball and hockey) in Gandar et al. (2002) and Gandar et al. (2004), we decided to initially split the 
data into home favorites (road underdogs) and road favorites (home underdogs) to examine the actions of bettors and 
observe results of various betting strategies. If sportsbooks were basing odds off of the flow of dollars bet and 
setting prices to balance the betting dollars, under the assumptions of the traditional models of sportsbook behavior, 
the odds should reflect the percentage of bets received on the favorite and the underdog. 
 The easiest place to begin with these detailed data is to plot the results. To illustrate the possible references 
of bettors and betting strategy results, we have arranged the data from the biggest favorites to the smallest favorites 
for the groupings of home favorites and road favorites. Given the availability of the game odds set by the 
sportsbook, the percentages bet on favorites and underdogs, and actual game results, we decided to plot all data side-
by-side in terms of betting percentages. 
 In terms of the favorite, the percentage of bets which the favorite should have attracted to balance the book 
(based on odds), the actual percentage bet on the favorite, and the actual win percentage of a strategy of betting the 
favorite are presented in Table 1. The data are arranged in terms of the percentage of unit bets which would 
constitute a proportionally balanced book, based on actual sportsbook odds, organized from highest percentage 
(biggest favorites) to lowest percentage (smallest favorites) from left-to-right. To clearly illustrate the tendencies and 
results, the actual betting percentages on favorites received by the sportsbook and the winning percentage of the 
favorite are shown as 25-game and 100-game moving averages, respectively. This plot allows an easy visual of this 
market.  
 For home favorites, the data appear somewhat closely grouped, although the expected percentages bet on 
the home favorite are generally slightly higher than the actual percentages bet on the home favorite. In addition, the 
moving average of the actual win percentage of the favorite appears to at least be within range of both other values. 
 The road favorites (home underdogs) tell a different story. As in Table 1 above, the expected percentage bet 
on the favorite based on the odds (to balance the book), the actual percentage bet on the road favorite, and the 
favorite win percentages are plotted together in Table 2. 
 In Table 2, it appears the expected percentage of bets (based on posted odds) on the favorite and the actual 
favorite win percentage appears to map rather closely together. On the other hand, the actual percentage bet on the 
road favorite exceeds the expected percentage bet (based on sportsbook odds) across the sample of road favorites. 
Visual evidence suggests odds are not set by the sportsbook based on the percentage wagered by bettors, as bettors 
seem to overestimate the odds of road favorites winning. It appears bettors prefer road favorites by a large margin, 
but this is not captured by the sportsbook odds, which, likely not coincidently, tend to map closer to actual favorite 
win percentages. The following sections present formal tests to explore the notion of bettor preferences, sportsbook 









1.1 Testing balanced book assumptions using simple regressions 
The premise of the traditional models of sportsbook behavior, in terms of pointspreads, was sportsbooks were 
attempting to attract even betting dollars on both sides of the proposition. If achieved, this position would clear the 
market and would allow the sportsbook to capture its commission on losing bets without risk. Extending this idea 
into odds wagering, such as hockey and baseball, sportsbooks were assumed to be attracting betting dollars 
proportionally with respect to odds. 
 If sportsbooks are not setting odds based on the betting percentages received on favorites and underdogs, 
they are not pricing to balance the book. If not pricing to balance the book, findings of market efficiency based on 
the actions of bettors in gambling markets are quite suspect. Bettors in the aggregate may not be revealing “The 
Wisdom of Crowds”, but may actually be quite biased, while the sportsbook may be setting the price (odds) for 
other purposes. 
 To test the null hypothesis that sportsbooks set odds to balance the book, we test the following simple 
regression model: 
 
 The dependent variable is the actual percentage bet on the favorite by bettors from the Sports Insights data. 
The independent variable is the percentage of unit bets on the favorite required to produce a proportionally balanced 
book, based on the posted sportsbook odds. If sportsbooks are setting prices to balance the book, = 0 and = 1. 
Therefore, a simple F-test for this null hypothesis is tested for the groups of home favorites and road favorites. 
Coefficients and t-statistics for the intercept and independent variable are presented along with the F-statistic for the 
null hypothesis of balanced book behavior by sportsbook in Tables 3 (home favorites) and 4 (road favorites). 
 The null hypothesis that sportsbooks set prices to balance the book is rejected for both samples. The actual 
percentage of bets on the favorite is not one-to-one with the odds set by the sportsbook. Within the relevant range 
within the sample, home favorites receive a slightly lower betting percentage than expected under the posted odds. 
For the sample of road favorites, as clearly illustrated in the graph in the previous section, road favorites attract 
higher betting percentages than expected under the set odds. 
 Overall, the null hypothesis that sportsbooks set odds (prices) to balance the book can be rejected. 
Sportsbooks do not set odds based solely on the actions of market participants. The alternative hypothesis here is not 
that sportsbooks set prices to maximize profits based on bettor misperceptions (as seen in Levitt (2004)), but simply 
that prices are not being set to balance the book. How and why sportsbooks are pricing the NHL market requires 
additional tests to determine if they are exploiting known bettor biases or pricing as a forecast to capture  
commissions in a long-run repeated game and discourage entry by informed bettors. 
 
1.2 Returns to betting strategies—NHL 2005–06 to 2007–08 
To determine if sportsbooks are truly pricing to maximize profits, as suggested by Levitt (2004), we examine returns 
to simple betting strategies. Examination of returns to simple betting strategies allows us to determine if the pricing 
by sportsbooks is efficient and if the sportsbook earns higher returns by pricing through some mechanism other than 
balancing the book. To begin, we simply calculate returns to betting strategies based on simple rules of wagering on 
all favorites or all underdogs for the entire sample and at various thresholds. As in the previous section, the sample 
is split into home favorites and road favorites. Table 5 presents the results for home favorites (road underdogs) and 
Table 6 presents the results for road favorites (home underdogs). 
 Table 5 shows a simple strategy of wagering on the underdog earns positive but not significant returns. 
Betting all road underdogs earns nearly two cents (0.0198) per dollar wagered and betting on all road underdogs 
where favorite odds are −200 or greater earns nearly six cents (0.0591) per dollar wagered. As in many other sports, 
a strategy of wagering on home favorites earns lower returns than wagering on road underdogs. It appears that 







than the market clearing price would imply, perhaps guarding against being overly lopsided on certain favorites. 
This slightly higher price set by the sportsbooks allows for contrarian bettors, those that prefer underdogs, to earn 
slightly positive returns, but these returns are not found to be statistically significant.  
 In the previous section it was shown bettors clearly prefer road favorites, placing an extremely high 
percentage of wagers on these teams. Despite this clear behavioral bias, the sportsbook does not appear to set prices 
to exploit these biases (or price to maximize profits in terms of Levitt (2004)). Prices appear to be set much closer to 
true probabilities on outcomes of games. A simple strategy of betting against popular public sentiment, wagering on 
the home underdog, does not earn positive profits. This strategy loses more than three cents (−0.0332) per dollar 
wagered, posting higher losses than a simple strategy of betting on the road favorite (−0.0137). Bigger road 
favorites, for instance those with favorite odds of −150 or greater, actually earn positive (but insignificant) returns 
(0.0311) in this small sample. 
 Although bettors have a clear behavioral bias for road favorites, sportsbooks appear to price more as a 





on road favorites. This result is similar to the sides and totals markets for the NBA (Paul and Weinbach 2008). 
Given the NHL market is even smaller than the daily market for the NBA, sportsbooks could be pricing as a forecast 
to discourage entry into this market by informed bettors, who may easily recognize the behavioral biases of the 
hockey betting public. This action prevents losses to “wiseguys” and still earns the sportsbook its commission on 
losing bets in the long-run. Given that betting behavior is likely to be a repeated game, as most bettors enjoy the act 
of betting on sporting events (the “consumption” element of betting), the sportsbook may actually earn higher profits 
by earning their commission on losing bets over a season (or many seasons) as opposed to pricing to exploit known 
biases, where recreational bettors may lose their bankroll for gambling quickly, and may not re-enter the market. 
 Given the availability of the betting percentages, determination of returns from other simple betting 
strategies are possible. One angle we examined were cases where the actual percentage bet was significantly higher 
or lower than the percentage bet suggested by the actual betting market odds. If odds were truly set to balance the 
book, with the assumption of equal expected returns to bets on the favorite and bets on the underdog, the betting 
odds can be used to calculate the percentage of unit bets on the favorite and underdog that would offer proportional 
balance to the sportsbook. Given this information and the actual betting percentage, it is possible to isolate games 
where the public has a higher percentage bet on one side than would be implied by the odds (or a lower percentage 
bet than implied by the odds). 
 This allows for an investigation of games involving informed betting, where the public is exploiting a weak 
line posted by the sportsbook or games involving uninformed betting, where the public overestimates the probability 
of a given team winning. If informed bettors truly exist and are betting to exploit incorrect betting lines, a betting 
strategy of wagering with the money should lead to profits. When the betting is uninformed, however, a betting 




money should lead to profits. Given public preferences for favorites, our initial notion (based on previous studies) 
was that it was likely that higher percentages of betting dollars on favorites would likely constitute uninformed 
betting action, while higher percentages of betting dollars on underdogs could indicate informed “smart money” 





 Not surprisingly, given the chart in the previous section, betting against the public when they overbet 
(compared to projected percentages based on posted odds) home favorites is found to be profitable. From Table 7, in 
all games where the percentage bet on the favorite exceeds the expected percentage bet on the favorite as implied by 
the odds, a strategy of wagering on underdogs earns more than seven cents (0.0711) per dollar bet, while wagering 
on these popular favorites loses nearly eight cents (−0.0795) per dollar bet. These returns reject the null of a fair bet 
(returns are equal to expected returns—given the commission charged on bets) and also rejects the null of no 
profitability (returns are greater than zero) at the ten percent level. In games where the public clearly favors the 
home favorite, yet the actual odds on the favorite are lower than the true price which would balance the book, 
wagering against public sentiment is profitable. 
 In relation to games where road underdogs receive a higher percentage of bets than implied by the odds, 
little in the way of profitability is found. For all games which meet this criteria, wagering with the public (betting on 
the underdog) loses slightly less than one cent (−0.0078) per dollar bet, while wagering against the public (betting 
on the favorite) loses more than two cents (−0.0244) per dollar bet. With road underdogs, finding a higher 
percentage of betting dollars on this side of the proposition does not imply “smart money” as it does not earn 
positive returns. 
 For the sample of road favorites (home underdogs), as presented in Table 8, statistically significant returns 
are not found in any of the wagering strategies. Positive returns are found for contrarian bettors in both cases 
(situations where more money is wagered on the road favorite than implied by the sportsbook odds and the case 
where more money is wagered on the home underdog than implied by the sportsbook odds) presented in Table 8. 
Given the sample size available to test these strategies, however, significance is not found.  
 These results imply that the sportsbook does earn some additional profits when the public bets games in a 
different proportion than those implied by the odds. This is not necessarily evidence, however, of pricing to exploit 
known bettor biases in all cases. In general, however, It does appear that bettors who follow a contrarian strategy, 
essentially wagering on the same side as the sportsbook (due to their non-proportional betting action compared to 
the odds), outperform those who wager with public sentiment. 
 
2 Conclusions and discussion of sportsbook behavior 
The availability of actual betting percentages allows for a more detailed study of the betting market for the National 
Hockey League. The traditional sportsbook models were based on the assumption of a balanced book, where equal 
amounts of money were attracted on each side of the proposition. This allowed for the testing of the efficient 
markets hypothesis, where the pointspread was tested as an optimal and unbiased predictor of the outcome of the 
game. Findings in support of the efficient markets hypothesis were deemed a result of market participants and 
contributed to the notion that bettors on the whole displayed the “wisdom of crowds” as pointspreads and totals 
generally appeared to represent reasonable, if not perfect, forecasts of outcomes of games. 
 Levitt (2004) challenged the view that sportsbooks set prices to balance the book (based on the actions of 
market participants) and showed, using a betting tournament, that sportsbooks will exploit clear bettor biases to 
maximize profits. The betting tournament data, however, did not perfectly mimic a true sportsbook, as it was a 
relatively small sample of bettors and did not include the marginal costs and benefits normally seen in these markets. 
 The availability of actual betting data from real sportsbooks, through www. sportsinsights.com, allows for a 
deeper understanding of sportsbook behavior and actions of participants within this market. In the odds-based 
market for the NHL, a few items are clear. First, sportsbooks do not set prices to balance the book. There are 
significant systematic imbalances of actual bets compared to expected bets proportional to the odds set by the 
sportsbook. This was seen through a simple plotting of the data for home and road favorites and also through f-tests 
based on simple regression results. Bettors definitely prefer road favorites, as percentages bet on these teams 
generally exceed the percentage of bets which would be expected based on the odds set by the sportsbook. 
 When sportsbooks do not price to balance the book, they do not necessarily price to exploit known biases to 
maximize profits. In some cases, odds (prices) are set slightly too high and the sportsbook earns greater profits given 
more of the betting dollars are on the losing side of the proposition. In most cases, however, it appears sportsbooks 
price as a forecast of the actual game outcome. This results in win frequencies for favorites and underdogs that are in 
line with the posted odds on the game. Therefore, in the long-run, simple strategies do not win enough to earn 
statistically significant profits despite the presence of bettor biases. 
 This long-run strategy of setting the odds as a forecast of actual game outcomes may occur for a variety of 
reasons, which could lead to greater profits for the sportsbook in the long-run. One reason for this strategy by the 
sportsbook is that betting is not generally a one-shot game, but a repeated game over a season or many seasons for 
the majority of bettors. When sportsbooks price as a forecast and favorites and underdogs have win percentages in 
line with posted odds, bettors are expected to lose the sportsbook commission (on losing bets) over a long period of 
time as they wager over the course of a season (or many seasons). If sportsbooks did price in line with bettor 
preferences (higher odds (prices) for road favorites, for instance), bettors may lose a greater sum more quickly, but 
may not continue their activity of betting over time. Therefore, a long-run strategy of pricing as a forecast may earn 
greater profits over time for the sportsbook, rather than pricing to exploit well-known biases for each game. 
 Another potential reason why sportsbooks may price as a forecast is to discourage entry into this market by 
informed bettors. If sportsbooks were to “shade” the odds toward road favorites (for example), informed bettors may 
enter the market and capture some of the profitability of the sportsbook for themselves. Pricing as an optimal and 
unbiased forecast discourages entry, as informed bettors are expected to lose the sportsbook commission on losing 
bets, and may allow the sportsbook to keep more of the profits for themselves, rather than simply transferring money 
from the uninformed public to informed bettors. 
 A third reason why sportsbooks may price as a forecast, as opposed to attempting to exploit known bettor 
biases, is that the active management of the sportsbook in setting biased odds may be quite costly. The transactions 
costs involved in attempting to limit or deny the betting actions of informed traders (to prevent them from exploiting 
the biased odds) may be more costly than the long-run profits which could be earned by setting biased odds. Given 
the size of the betting market, especially the hockey betting market, it may simply not be worth it to try to actively 
exploit bettor biases to earn higher profits1. Given that hockey gamblers may also wager on other sports or place 
bets in on-line casinos (or play slots or table games in actual casinos which also offer sports wagering in Nevada), 
pricing to exploit the biases of these bettors may lead to these recreational gamblers to lose enough money in a short 
period of time to quit gambling altogether or drive them to bet at competing sportsbooks that tend to offer more 
attractive odds on favorites. This may ultimately lead to fewer long-run profits for sportsbooks and the gambling 
business in general, if they chose to actively pursue this pricing strategy. 
 The findings that sportsbooks do not set prices to balance the book calls into question the source of past 
findings of market efficiency in sports wagering markets and its underlying support for the forecasting power of 
prediction markets. Under the balanced book assumption, findings of market efficiency were deemed a result of the 
actions of bettors. When sportsbooks do not desire a balanced book, due to pricing as a forecast of game outcomes, 
                                                          
1 For sports with extremely large betting volume, such as the NFL, it may become worth the transactions costs to actively price to exploit known 
bettor biases, which could be why betting on home underdogs (against road favorites) were found to earn profits in the professional football  
betting market (Levitt 2004). 
findings where the null hypothesis of efficient markets could not be rejected may be the result of excellent 
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